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CONTINUITY AND COHERENCE IN THE REHNQUIST COURT 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS* 
Tom Merrill’s excellent Childress Lecture1 will be seen as a heralding 
example of a new trend: the social science explanation of Supreme Court 
judicial decision making.  Building on the insights of political scientists such 
as Lee Epstein,2 Professor Merrill’s study seeks to apply social science 
empiricism and strategic thinking to explain the inner workings of the Court 
and the shape of its doctrine.  According to its proponents, such explanations 
are more realistic and more accurate than the more traditional treatments of the 
Court that Professor Merrill calls Weltanschauungs (a German term used by 
Anglo-Saxon academics almost always carries with it a faint hint of 
disparagement),3 which seek to locate a Court’s doctrine in some overarching 
theory of jurisprudence or political science.  As one who has recently offered 
such a global perspective on the Rehnquist Court,4 I suggest here that while 
Professor Merrill’s social science approach has insights, it suffers from many 
of the same difficulties of imprecision as more traditional accounts.  Moreover, 
it fails to represent fully and accurately the nature of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence because it slights methodogical commitments and an era’s social 
thought in shaping legal doctrine.  Once those influences over a particular 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence are recognized, traditional accounts continue to 
offer a richer explanation than those offered by the new social science. 
Professor Merrill’s analysis divides the Court into the “first” and “second” 
Rehnquist Courts, which he argues are quite distinct.5  The first spanned the 
years 1987 to 1994, while the second began in 1994 and continues to the 
present.  The essence of his thesis is that each Court had a different, but 
overlapping, five-member majority of conservative Justices.  These 
 
* Professor, Northwestern University Law School.  Thanks to Neal Devins and Mark Movsesian 
for comments, and to Tom Merrill for recommending me as a commentator.  I am also grateful to 
Saint Louis University for its great hospitality at the conference where these remarks were 
delivered. 
 1. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 3. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 571. 
 4. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 5. Merrill, supra note 1, at 576-590. 
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conservatives, having failed to make progress for certain conservative policy 
preferences on social issues in the first Court, switched to conservative 
preferences on federalism issues in the second Court because they could reach 
a greater consensus on these issues.  According to Professor Merrill, Justice 
Scalia was the strategic catalyst for this change. 
My problems with the social science approach begin with the attitudinal 
model under which judges vote their preferences and the Court’s jurisprudence 
results from these preferences.  Professor Merrill, as the sophisticated legal 
scholar and former Deputy Solicitor General that he is, obviously does not 
accept the simplistic model that the Justices simply vote their policy 
preferences.  He recognizes that preferences can include jurisprudential 
positions.6  For instance, judges may have methodological commitments such 
as originalism, textualism, or respect for precedent that substantially constrain 
their first-order policy preferences.  Once the model is expanded, however, to 
include such preferences, the new model of social science begins to look like 
the old model in which legal methodology, particularly in choices of 
interpretative method, has a very substantial influence in generating the 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
Taking account of these methodological preferences also undermines 
Professor Merrill’s basic thesis that a dichotomy exists between the behavior of 
the conservative Justices in what he calls the first and second Rehnquist 
Courts.  All of these Justices—Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy—
have shared throughout both the first and second Rehnquist Courts at least a 
soft originalism committed to reviving the texts and structures of the 
Constitution of 1787 insofar as their other methodological attachments, such as 
an attachment to precedents, permit.  Of course, no two of these Justices have 
precisely the same commitments.  Justice Scalia, for instance, practices a far 
stricter originalism than either Justices O’Connor or Kennedy.  All take more 
seriously, however, arguments from text, structure, and historical 
understanding than did most Justices in the Warren and Burger Courts. 
The consequences of such a revival are striking—a rediscovery of the 
decentralizing structures of the Constitution that were obscured by the 
jurisprudence of the New Deal, Warren, and Burger Courts.  As I have 
previously discussed, these Justices have moved to embrace federalism and the 
First Amendment protections for mediating associations, both civil and 
religious.7  Thus, these Justices have voted to breathe new life into 
constitutional mechanisms that promote competition in social norms, whether 
they relate to invigorating competition among states, or among private 
associations, or between secular and religious associations.  More than the 
 
 6. Id. at 592. 
 7. See McGinnis, supra note 4. 
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Courts of the past half century, these Justices tend to favor the states over the 
federal government, and private mediating institutions over the states. 
While the conservative Justices have some substantial agreement in much 
of their legal methodology, they differ on their willingness to adhere to 
established precedent—another key axis of legal craft—with Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy more willing to accept as stare decisis decisions that 
they may believe were wrongly decided as an original matter.  The Rehnquist 
Court decisions, therefore, are largely generated by the combination of these 
two commitments—a commitment to restoring the structures that had been 
obscured by the New Deal and Warren Courts, and a commitment to 
precedent, under which the two most precedent-respecting Justices are a 
restraint on how far the Court can go in its revival.  This second commitment, 
of course, explains the failure to overrule Roe v. Wade.8 
It is true that the attitudinal model of social science is useful in formalizing 
the obvious truth that the Court’s jurisprudence is likely to change when one 
Justice is substituted for another.  The Rehnquist Court did change when 
Clarence Thomas became the fifth Justice in the conservative majority rather 
than Byron White.9  Even this perspective, however, misses the broader view 
of what Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, a hard edged originalism that would 
revive much of the Constitution of 1787, reflects about the temper of our 
time—the dissatisfaction with more centralized forms of government decision 
making that were more popular in previous eras.  The New Deal Constitution 
reflected the enthusiasm for centralized decision making in its reinterpretation 
of the Commerce Clause and Separation of Powers provisions that facilitated 
the national administrative state.  The Warren and Burger Courts extended this 
enthusiasm for centralization to the social arena where the Court took it upon 
itself to determine the content of national rights under the rubric of its 
substantive due process jurisprudence.  The appointment of someone like 
Justice Thomas and the rise of strong originalism as a thinkable methodology 
of judging was possible only after the perceived failures of centralized 
government stimulated a renewed consideration of the virtues of the Framers’ 
Constitution.  Hence, Justice Thomas’s appointment is a confirmation of the 
changing political ideals that have propelled originalism’s revival and that 
explain much of the Rehnquist Court’s doctrine. 
One way of bringing this point home is to contrast a paradigm conservative 
Justice on the Rehnquist Court, like Justice Thomas, and the paradigm 
 
 8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 9. Justice Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood Marshall, a noted liberal.  Justice White was 
replaced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, whom Professor Merrill regards as part of the liberal 
bloc.  Thus, the substitution of Justice Thomas for Justice White represents the net change in the 
composition of the conservative majority. 
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conservative Justice on the Warren Court, the second Justice John Marshall 
Harlan.  Justice Harlan was not a systematic orginalist nor a textualist.  He was 
a common-law constitutionalist.10  He respected precedent, although his 
respect was consistent with slow evolution of legal norms.  His methodological 
commitments stand in stark contrast to those of Justice Thomas, who hews to 
the original understanding of the Constitution and is willing to depart from 
precedent when that precedent is at war with that understanding.  Evolution of 
constitutional norms plays no substantial part in Justice Thomas’s thinking.  
From the perspective of a conservative of the Rehnquist era, like Justice 
Thomas, Justice Harlan’s jurisprudence sometimes seems not much sounder 
from a methodological perspective than that of Warren Court liberals, and the 
results not strikingly different—the same direction, only slower.  The political 
and legal ideals of the time must be invoked to explain this fundamental shift 
of conservative perspective.  Justice Harlan reflected the consensus politics of 
the post-war era, in which both parties had more confidence in national power 
than Republicans do today.  In contrast, Justice Scalia and, to an even greater 
extent, Justice Thomas reflect modern conservatism’s fundamental challenge 
to that consensus.  Hence, they are much more willing to embrace a 
methodology that leads to results radically at odds with the jurisprudence that 
was the product of that consensus. 
Certainly, I think that the substantial change in the nature of conservative 
jurisprudence from the Warren Court to the Rehnquist Court is part of what 
historians will focus on a hundred years hence, and it is an important part of a 
fruitful explanation of this Court.  Supreme Court jurisprudence of any era is, 
to some degree, a cultural artifact.  An opinion of an era, like a popular song, 
rests on complex strands of sensibilities peculiar to the age.  Our analysis of 
the Court must reflect this understanding to ring true.  The somewhat myopic 
view of the new social science has trouble focusing on explanations that will 
integrate the Court’s jurisprudence with the rest of an era’s social thought. 
Now perhaps Professor Merrill might suggest that the attitudinal model can 
encompass such gestalt switches—they simply represent a change in a lot of 
preferences.  I think, however, this perspective misses the larger story: judges’ 
views are not simply a collection of preferences, but instead are a 
jurisprudence that emerges dialectically from substantive and methodological 
commitments.  In our era, a change in societal perspective caused legal 
 
 10. For a discussion of what a conservative common law constitutionalist is, see Ernest 
Young, Rediscovering Convervatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 717-18 (1994).  I believe Justice Harlan fits the definition 
better than Justices O’Connor or Kennedy, who, despite a respect for precedent, have been 
willing to cut back sharply on emerging traditions such as the pre-Lopez view that the federal 
government was not substantially limited by the enumerated powers in its regulation. 
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theorists to take a renewed look at originalism, which, in turn, has 
systematically reoriented Supreme Court doctrine. 
In contrast, Professor Merrill offers an explanation of the Rehnquist Court 
that self-consciously holds at arm’s length any explanation of the Court’s 
jurisprudence based on an inner legal or social theory logic.  He suggests, 
instead, that it is a result of strategic decisions by individual Justices in pursuit 
of their preferences, given the constraints of external actors, like the Congress 
and the public.  He uses the Rehnquist Court as an example of these new social 
science explanations.  He claims that the Rehnquist Court conservatives have 
shifted strategically away from social issues to federalism and, further, that 
Justice Scalia is the strategic catalyst in that shift. 
Professor Merrill, however, has a problem of characterization in saying 
that the second Rehnquist Court has largely abandoned social issues.  This 
problem of characterization or coding, to use social science terminology, is 
another consideration that makes it unclear whether the new social science 
provides much of an advance in precision over older forms of legal 
explanation.  The new social science categorizes, codes, and then aggregates 
cases in order to count them, so as to create a database for its explanations.  
Such categorization, however, requires judgments that are subjective and open 
to dispute. 
What counts as a social issue in the Rehnquist Court is an example of 
subjective judgment.  It is true that the second Rehnquist Court is no longer 
addressing social issues through a jurisprudence of fundamental rights, but that 
is because of the Court’s methodological reorientation.  In Washington v. 
Glucksberg (the right to die case),11 the Rehnquist Court made clear that it will 
be loathe to create new fundamental rights, leaving Roe without much 
generative force outside the abortion area.  The Court, however, has continued 
to focus on controversial social issues in other areas of public life, advancing 
an approach to social issues rooted in an interpretation of a particular text of 
the Constitution—the First Amendment, with both its religion and free speech 
clauses.  Such a jurisprudence does not mean that the second Rehnquist Court 
is abandoning social issues.  Instead, it is addressing them in a framework 
more consistent with its methodological commitments. 
Most notable on the Court’s agenda, of course, is religion, which may be 
our most salient and enduring social issue.  Politically, regular attendance at 
religious services was a better predictor than high income of who voted for 
George W. Bush.12  Socially, religion remains the social institution with the 
most influence over behavior.  Thus, the Court decisions expanding the role of 
 
 11. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 12. See Ronald Brownstein, A Red-Blue State Stalemate?, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 18, 2002, at 
37. 
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religion in social life may be the most important kind of decisions about social 
issues.  Here, the Court in a series of cases has clarified, and to some degree 
relaxed, the strictures on government aid to religion, culminating in its epochal 
decision to uphold the constitutionality of school vouchers.13  Labeled by some 
as equal in importance to Brown v. Board of Education,14 this last decision is 
surely one of the most important social issue decisions for our generation 
because it permits religious denominations to operate schools with public 
funds.  This funding, in turn, enables religious institutions to compete on a 
more equal footing with public schools in the most important arena of social 
norms—the transmission of values to the next generation.15  The vouchers case 
thus changes the balance of power between secular and religious educational 
institutions.  It is difficult to understand why this decision should not be 
categorized as a social issues case since this new balance may ultimately affect 
future decisions on the entire range of matters that Professor Merrill 
categorizes as social issues, including abortion. 
Paralleling the Court’s treatment of funding for religious schools under the 
Establishment Clause is its treatment of access to school facilities for religious 
groups under the Free Speech Clause.  These cases also address the important 
social issue of the extent to which religious influence is permitted in public 
life.  In a series of cases, the Court has held that the First Amendment requires 
that schools who open their facilities to secular groups also open them to 
religious groups, rejecting the argument that the religious expression 
conducted under a neutral access principle presents an Establishment Clause 
violation.16  The most recent of these cases, Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School,17 is the most instructive because the contemplated after-school 
activity in that case was pervasively religious.18  There, the Rehnquist Court 
has established an equal facilities doctrine for religion, requiring infrastructure, 
in terms of physical facilities, to be available for expressive purposes to 
religious associations if they are made available for expressive purposes to 
secular associations.  This line of important cases also advances a 
jurisprudence of Hayekian spontaneous order to address social issues because 
it allows religious ideals on character-building and other social norms to 
compete with secular ideas and norms. 
 
 13. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 15. See John O. McGinnis, The Enlightenment Case for Vouchers, 57  N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 75 (2000) (describing the importance of educational competition for the formation of good 
social norms). 
 16. The leading case in this area is Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 17. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 18. Id. at 103 (describing the religious nature of the activities at issue in Good News Club). 
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To be sure, as Professor Merrill notes, in such cases as Lee v. Weisman19 
and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Roe,20 the Court has refused to 
permit government to sponsor religious observance.  The school prayer cases, 
however, are completely consistent with cases approving generally available 
aid to religion if the Court is pursuing, as I have argued, a Hayekian 
jurisprudence that promotes spontaneous order through the religion clause of 
the First Amendment.21  Through both sets of decisions the Court is promoting 
a decentralized competition of social norms: the government is permitted to 
facilitate the competition of norms on an equal basis through the neutral 
provisions of funds, but it is restrained from imposing its own norms through 
sponsoring prayer in public schools.  The embrace of this distinctive 
jurisprudence pushes a particular kind of social jurisprudence—one where the 
competition of private actors rather than government impositions should be the 
generative force for social norms. 
Moreover, the Court’s jurisprudence also comports with the respect for 
precedent that I noted earlier.  The school prayer cases had clear rules: the 
government could not sponsor prayer in schools.  They were, thus, powerful 
precedent for Lee and Santa Fe to follow.  In contrast, the line the Court had 
drawn for permissible and impermissible aid to religion was notoriously 
difficult to apply.22  For reasons of legal craft, therefore, a neutrality rule 
became a powerful competitor to that vacillating line of previous jurisprudence 
on religious aid.  Thus, these cases seem better grounded in a paradigm that 
combines both political theory and jurisprudential considerations like 
precedent than the kind of strategic behavior Professor Merrill adduces. 
As Professor Merrill acknowledges, the second Rehnquist Court also has 
focused on the important social issue of homosexuality in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale23 and in Romer v. Evans.24  Homosexuality presents a more 
live social issue in our time than race or gender because there is much less of 
an uncontested core consensus on the issues of sexual orientation.  Here, again 
the Court deployed a Hayekian jurisprudence.  By permitting the Boy Scouts to 
exclude a leader who would interfere with their message, Dale maximizes the 
autonomy of private mediating institutions to set their own norms.  By 
preventing the state from imposing special constitutional obstacles onto civil 
rights legislation for homosexuals, Romer requires the government not to 
 
 19. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 20. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 21. McGinnis, supra note 4, at 543. 
 22. As the Supreme Court itself admitted.  See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court’s aid to parochial school cases 
“sacrifice[] clarity and predictability for flexibility”). 
 23. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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discriminate in the norms it applies.  Moreover, once again in Dale the Court is 
building on precedent—the growing protection for expression, particularly 
joint expression by groups that the Court has been providing in the past few 
years.25 
Just as I think it is not accurate to say that the second Rehnquist Court has 
given up on social issues, I do not think it is correct to say that the first 
Rehnquist Court did not attempt to promote federalism.  For instance, as 
Professor Merrill himself admits, New York v. United States26 was decided by 
the first Rehnquist Court.  New York was a crucial decision in the federalism 
revolution, because it impeded federal officials from using the federal system 
to avoid accountability by making state officials appear responsible for 
decisions over which they had no control.  Moreover, New York v. United 
States is a characteristic decision of the Rehnquist Court in that it deployed the 
history of the Constitutional Convention to preclude the federal government 
from indirectly regulating citizens by issuing orders to state government, rather 
than regulating citizens directly by passing federal laws.  Like the other 
federalism decisions of United States v. Lopez27 and United States v. 
Morrison,28 New York also is characteristic of the Rehnquist Court in that it 
overruled no precedent, although it did unsettle expectations that no 
congressional law would be invalidated ever again on federalism grounds. 
Moreover, the first Rehnquist Court also rendered an important federalism 
decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft.29  There, it held that federal laws would apply 
to operations of state governments only if Congress clearly expressed its 
intention that those laws be so applied.30  This “clear statement” rule made it 
easier for states to mobilize their resources against such applications by forcing 
federal representatives to be explicit.  This rule certainly promoted a more 
federalism-friendly jurisprudence. 
More generally, it is quite clear that two other members of the Court—
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor—were interested in restricting 
the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states long before the 
“second Rehnquist Court.”  After all, they both vigorously dissented in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.31  Given these Justices’ interest 
in federalism both before and after the first Rehnquist Court, the most 
 
 25. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995). 
 26. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 28. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 29. 501 U.S. 452  (1991). 
 30. Id. at 470. 
 31. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that traditional state functions were not immune from 
federal regulation). 
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parsimonious explanation for the lack of federalism focus in the first Rehnquist 
Court is that the docket did not provide the relatively unusual opportunities to 
advance federalism without overruling precedent—the kind of pro-federalism 
decisions that New York, Lopez, Morrison, and Gregory all represented.  
Moreover, as I recognize above, Professor Merrill is certainly correct that 
Justice Thomas made a difference: without Justice Thomas, those in favor of 
federalism still lacked the votes to achieve their objectives. 
I am also skeptical that Justice Scalia was the strategic catalyst of these 
changes.  My first reaction is one of amusement.  Scalia a strategist?  Is it 
strategic to write barbed concurrences and dissents that alienate other Justices?  
Seriously, however, I think the claim that Justice Scalia is strategically shifting 
from social issues to federalism belies his deep methodological commitments.  
More than most Justices who have sat on the Court, Justice Scalia does not 
simply have a set of preferences, he has a jurisprudence—originalism.  We 
know this both because he has said so in no uncertain terms and because he has 
made decisions rooted in his view of the original understanding that sit 
uneasily with the preferences of political conservatives.  For instance, in 
Maryland v. Craig,32 Justice Scalia dissented from a decision that upheld a 
statute which permitted a child to testify out of sight of the defendant who had 
allegedly abused her.  While this provision offered protections for victims of 
crime and so was supported by conservatives, Justice Scalia dissented because 
the language of the Confrontation Clause required face-to-face confrontation of 
the accused with an accuser even when the accuser was a child.33  He has also 
frustrated efforts by conservatives to use the Constitution to reform state tort 
law.  He refused to impose substantive due process limits on punitive damages 
because he believed that the substantive due process theory behind such 
limitations is not well-rooted in the Constitution.34 
If originalism, rather than a set of conservative policy preferences, is 
Justice Scalia’s core commitment (tempered by some respect for very well-
established precedent), it is not at all surprising that he supports federalism.  
After all, federalism was the keystone of the original understanding.35  While it 
is true that some of his federalism jurisprudence, like that of sovereign 
 
 32. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 33. Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Whatever else it may mean in addition, the 
defendant’s constitutional right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him’ means, always 
and everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: the ‘‘right to meet face to face all those who 
appear and give evidence at trial.’’” (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)))). 
 34. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607  (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 35. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 237 
(1994) ( “The two most important features of the government the framers created are federalism 
and the separation of powers.”). 
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immunity, depends on structural rather than textual support, Justice Scalia has 
made clear both in his theoretical writing and his separations of powers 
jurisprudence that he believes structural arguments are essential implements in 
the toolbox of constitutional interpretation.  For instance, in Morrison v. 
Olson,36 Justice Scalia argued in dissent that the independent counsel law was 
inconsistent with the President’s constitutional authority to fire executive 
officers at will.  This authority is not expressly granted in the Constitution, and 
Justice Scalia based his arguments in part on structural considerations such as 
the need for the President to control the executive branch to preserve the 
equilibrium among the branches.37  Justice Scalia also expressly noted that 
structural arguments are a component of originalism in his essay, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil.38  Thus, Justice Scalia’s federalism jurisprudence can be seen 
to flow from long-standing jurisprudential methodology. 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil is also relevant to Professor Merrill’s 
arguments that Justice Scalia’s federalism opinions are insufficiently reasoned 
(and so suggest a lack of sincerity).  In this essay, Justice Scalia suggests that 
originalist Supreme Court opinions, like Myers v. United States,39 can never 
amass the totality of evidence for their positions because the opinions would 
simply be too long.  Thus, the sovereign immunity decisions may enjoy more 
support in the original understanding than their opinions actually provide.  In a 
lengthy article, Professor Michael Rappaport, for instance, has recently tried to 
show that the sovereign immunity decisions are rooted in the original 
understanding of the word “state,” because the concept of state at the time of 
the framing was widely recognized to carry with it immunity from litigation by 
citizens.40 
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence shows a sincere interest in 
federalism well before the strategic turn claimed by Professor Merrill.  In CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,41 Justice Scalia radically sought to limit 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  He wanted to jettison the balancing test that 
gives the Supreme Court authority to invalidate state laws on the basis of their 
burden on interstate commerce in favor of a test that invalidated them only 
when they actually discriminated against citizens of other states.42  It is hard to 
 
 36. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 37. Id. at 703-15 (Scalia, J, dissenting). 
 38. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 39. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 40. Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism with Federalism: The Proper Textual 
Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 
821-22 (1999). 
 41. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 42. Id. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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think of any other Justice in history who struck such a blow for the states so 
early in his career. 
Professor Merrill also cites an article of Justice Scalia’s about federalism 
that was written in 1982 to suggest that Justice Scalia was not enthusiastic 
about federalism.43  That article, however, does not seem inconsistent with a 
jurisprudence that seeks to keep Congress within its enumerated powers.  It 
instead supports a claim that conservatives should respect the federal 
government’s power over national commerce—a power the Constitution 
clearly gives the federal government.44  Justice Scalia can logically both 
provide the federal government a wide berth within its enumerated powers and 
nevertheless enforce the enumerated powers against the federal government. 
Thus, while Professor Merrill argues that Justice Scalia’s doctrine of 
preemption undermines the sincerity of his support for federalism, it flows 
from this coherent position.  If one believes that the Constitution provides the 
federal government appropriate authority for matters like national defense and 
spillovers among the states, it is plausible that within that government’s 
authority the Court should be vigorous in preempting state laws.  I myself have 
argued previously that some centralized authority, such as the authority to keep 
open the avenues of trade and investment among the states is necessary to 
make devolution and competition among the states work well.45  It is true that 
the federal government’s authorities after the New Deal exceed what is 
necessary to address and create the optimal conditions for competition, but in 
the economic realm these authorities rest on such substantial precedent that no 
precedent-respecting Court will overturn them.  The problem with preemption 
in the modern jurisprudence on this view may not be the scope of preemption 
but the scope of the enumerated powers within which the federal government 
enacts its legislation. 
Thus, I ultimately find Professor Merrill’s strategic actor account 
unpersuasive both generally with respect to the Rehnquist Court and 
specifically with respect to Justice Scalia.  The first and second Rehnquist 
Courts as well as Justice Scalia himself have a greater continuity and 
coherence both substantively and methodologically than Professor Merrill 
admits.  Methodologically, they represent a move toward a jurisprudence more 
informed by the materials relevant to original understanding—text, structure, 
and history—although this movement respects precedent as well, largely 
because of the views of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy. 
 
 43. Merrill, supra note 1, at 610 nn.149-52 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 20 
(1982). 
 45. McGinnis, supra note 4, at 508. 
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Substantively, the Rehnquist Court has been pursuing a coherent 
jurisprudence that invigorates decentralization and the spontaneous ordering of 
social norms that Alexis de Tocqueville celebrated in Democracy in America46 
as being the essence of the social order generated by our original Constitution.  
In a range of doctrinal areas—federalism, freedom of association, the religion 
clauses, and the balance of power between juries and judges—the Court is 
helping sustain a civil order that bubbles up from state governments or from 
citizens voluntarily gathered together or randomly selected.47  This 
jurisprudence responds to the political understandings of our era where social 
theories, such as public choice, have shown that the disproportionate influence 
of special interest groups and the inattention of the general citizenry can 
prevent centralized democracy from measuring majority will and producing 
good social norms.  In contrast, the kind of decentralized civic order described 
by Tocqueville engages the citizen and restrains special interests through 
competition, whether the competition is among different states or among 
different associations.  The Rehnquist Court jurisprudence is designed to 
sustain this more decentralized system of order by protecting from centralized 
power the autonomy of mediating institutions and state governments that serve 
as “discovery machines” for decentralized social norms. 
Professor Merrill kindly acknowledges my alternative view of the 
Rehnquist Court, but suggests it has flaws: 
McGinnis’s devolutionary theory . . . cannot account for the continued 
willingness of the Court to find state laws preempted by federal regulation, to 
strike down discriminatory state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, and to eliminate state experimentation with different sorts of electoral 
regimes under an ever-expanding First Amendment.48 
I do not believe that the doctrines are as problematic for my theory as 
Professor Merrill asserts. 
First, as I explained above, preemption is at least compatible with a 
devolutionary theory.  Second, the Court’s failure to excise the dormant 
Commerce Clause is consistent with the respect for precedent that marks the 
Rehnquist Court.  The dormant Commerce Clause has been around for more 
than a century—far longer than the centralizing jurisprudence of the New Deal.  
It is hardly surprising that the current Court has not summarily disposed of it.  
What is surprising is that some Justices are willing to overrule it.  Given the 
venerable nature of the contrary precedent, their votes actually show the 
strength of the devolutionary ideals of our time.  Given differing legal 
 
 46. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Henry Reeve trans., Francis Bowen rev., Vintage Books 1990) (1835). 
 47. See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 489-495 
 48. Merrill, supra note 1, at 571. 
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methodological commitments of Justices (for instance, to precedent), no new 
jurisprudential pattern will ever work itself pure.  The primary jurisprudential 
currents (like spontaneous order) can be discerned only by recognizing that 
these methodological commitments will create backwaters and eddies of their 
own. 
Finally, the Court’s willingness to wield the First Amendment against the 
states is consistent with my devolutionary theory, because the First 
Amendment protects the ability of private actors, including mediating 
institutions, to create a market for social norms.49  This market can be even 
more effective than competition among the states.50  Within the scope of the 
First Amendment, therefore, the Court is right to protect the autonomy of the 
private mediating institutions against the states just as it protects the autonomy 
of states against the federal government.  Both actions devolve power to more 
effective fora for competition in social norms.  Thus, when the Court struck 
down a blanket primary regulation, as it did in California Democratic Party v. 
Jones,51 it did so in favor of the autonomy of mediating institutions—in this 
case, political parties that are themselves important vehicles for competitive 
norm creation. 
In my view, traditional legal scholarship—the close analysis of legal 
doctrine and legal methodology in the context of an era’s social thought—still 
has the power to provide a more compelling description of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.  Here, I reveal myself doubly as a stick in the mud—
methodologically as well as substantively.  Traditional scholarship, rather than 
the new social science of positive jurisprudence, is needed to tell the most 
salient story of the Rehnquist Court—how it is moving toward a restoration of 
the devolution and spontaneous order more in keeping with both the Framers’ 
ideas and our own. 
 
 49. See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 526-29. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
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